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ESTOPPEL AND TEXTUALISM
Gregory E. Maggs*
I. Introduction
Courts regularly conclude that parties in lawsuits are ‘estopped’ - that
is, involuntarily barred - from asserting claims and defenses, from seeking
remedies, from presenting testimony or other evidence, or from making
certain kinds of arguments.1 The reasons for judicially imposed estoppel
vary but most often the estoppel serves to prevent one party from taking a
position that will cause an unjust harm to another.2 For example, a court
might decide that a person who makes a statement on which someone else
has relied is estopped from later taking a legal position that contradicts the
statement.3
Textualism is an influential school of statutory interpretation. Its tenets
restrict what courts may consider when construing legislation. Under the
theory of textualism, judges are to determine the objective meaning of an

*

Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Professors
Jonathan S iegel and Peter M aggs o ffered m any useful suggestions.
1
See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535
U.S. 722 (U.S. 2002) (patent holder estopped from making claims regarding patent
based on patent prosecution history); In re Adoption of S.A.J., 838 A.2d 616 (Pa.
2003) (man who c laimed he was not the father of a child in child support
proceedings was estopped from claiming he was the father in attempting to block
the child ’s adoption).
2
As one state supreme court has concisely stated: ‘Estoppel is a legal concept
which bars a party from alleging or denying certain rights which might otherwise
have existed beca use of the party’s voluntary conduct.’ Hoar v. Aetna Cas. and Sur.
Co., 968 P.2d 12 19, 1 222 (Okla. 1998).
3
See Black’s Law Dictionary 590 (Bryan A. G arner, ed., 8th ed. 2004) (defining
“equitable estoppel as a “defensive do ctrine p reventing one party from taking unfair
advantage of another when, through false language or conduct, the person to be
estopped has induced another person to act in a ce rtain way, with the result that the
other perso n has b een injured in some way. ...”).
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enactment from its text and its legislative context.4 They should not allow
legislative history and policy arguments to influence their interpretations
or take it upon themselves to find exceptions, glosses, or creative interpretations of the plain meaning of statutes.5
In many lawsuits, estoppel and textualism have nothing to do with each
other. For example, courts often apply principles of estoppel*168 in
common law cases, where they have no occasion to interpret any legislation. 6 Likewise, in deciding statutory cases, judges often have no reason to
apply principles of estoppel because neither party has caused the kind of
harm that estoppel addresses. For instance, if the defendant has not made
any statements or taken any position on which the plaintiff has relied, then
the plaintiff generally has no grounds for seeking to estop the defendant
from raising a defense.
But estoppel and textualism do sometimes appear to collide. Judges
often hold that parties are estopped from asserting rights that they have
under a statute, even though the statute contains no express estoppel
exception. The typical statute of limitations provides the simplest and
perhaps most common example. 7 The statute may say that a plaintiff must
bring a particular kind of legal action, such as an intentional tort claim,
within one year.8 Ordinarily, one year means one year, and most statutes
of limitation contain no express exceptions. But almost all courts including those that ordinarily follow textualist precepts - stand ready to

4

See id. at 1462, 1516; Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347
(2005); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. L.
Rev. 1 (20 01).
5
See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
35-3 6 (1997 ).
6
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 894 illus. 1 (1979) (providing an
exam ple in which a landowner who incorrectly describes a pro perty b ound ary is
estopped to maintain a trespass action against his neighbor who relied on the
erroneous descriptio n).
7
A computer search for “date(>1/1/1990) and estoppel and ‘statute of
limitations”’ in WestLaw’s ALLC ASE S datab ase yields more than 10,00 0 cases.
8

See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215 (McKinney 1999) (‘The following actions shall
be commenced within one year: ... an action to recover damages for assault, battery,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, libel, slander, false words causing
special damages, or a violation of the right of privacy under section fifty-one of the
civil rights law ....’).
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extend the period, based on principles of estoppel, if the defendant has done
something unjust, like concealing evidence of the claim.9
So the question arises: How might judges who purport to adhere to
textualism justify their use of estoppel to affect the application of statutes
that say nothing about estoppel? Are they creating policy based exceptions
to legislation? Or is the proper characterization of what they are doing
more complicated than that?
This essay seeks to answer these questions. It considers six possible
arguments that courts have made or might make to rationalize the recognition of unwritten exceptions to statutes in the name of estoppel. These
arguments include the following:
* Even though the statutory provision at issue says nothing about
estoppel, some other legislation expressly authorizes courts to invoke
equitable principles, including estoppel;
* The legislation contains an implied term authorizing the application
of estoppel principles;
* Courts have inherent equitable powers that allow them to apply
principles of estoppel;
*169 * The legislature that enacted the statute reasonably expected that
courts would interpret it in accordance with accepted canons and background principles, including estoppel;
* Estoppel creates a cause of action or other legal right that the statute,
by its terms, does not address; and
* Binding precedent compels the application of estoppel principles, even
if they conflict with the text of the statute.
Each of the six arguments, as discussed in part III below, has some
validity. Any one of them might justify uses of estoppel in at least some
instances. But as this essay will show, none of the arguments provides a
general basis upon which a textualist judge can use estoppel to affect the
application of statutes that do not address estoppel. The essay therefore
concludes that some unresolved tension exists between traditional estoppel
principles and textualism.
Before addressing this subject further, I should make two preliminary
remarks. First, this essay does not advocate that judges should or should

9

See infra part II.A. for more deta il on this point.
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not follow the textualist school of statutory interpretation. Many other
works address the question of how courts should interpret statutes.10 Nor
is the goal of the article to persuade judges to stop invoking principles of
estoppel. This essay instead seeks only to take an academic look at the
question of how judges who have already adopted a textualist jurisprudence
might reconcile estoppel and their textualist views. In other words, it looks
for an explanation, but does not make a prescription.
Second, this essay grew out of my assignment as the United States
national reporter for the topic of ‘Protecting Legitimate Expectations and
Estoppel’ at the XVIIth Congress of the International Academy of
Comparative Law.11 In this capacity, I prepared answers to a standard set
of questions posed by Professor Bénédicte Fauvarque Cosson, the general
rapporteur for the subject.12 This essay addresses selected aspects of
Professor Cosson’s questions. My complete answers are filed separately
with the Conference.
*170 II. Textualism and Estoppel
A. Estoppel
Black’s Law Dictionary concisely defines estoppel as a ‘bar that
prevents one from asserting a claim or right that contradicts what one has
said or done before or what has been legally established as true.’13 The
dictionary also separately defines dozens of different kinds of estoppel that

10

See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation (1994); Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes
(1982); John M anning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 685 (1999); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New
Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacopho ny and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 749 (1995 ); Da niel A. Farber, The Inevitability of
Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 533
(1992); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the
Courtroo m, 50 U. Chi. L. Re v. 800 (1983 ).
11
This conference is scheduled for July 16-22, 2006, at Utrecht in the
Netherlands.
12
The questionnaire, posed to reporters from many different countries, includes
inquiries such as: ‘How important is the concept of legitimate expectations or
estoppel in your legal system? Wha t is the part played by such a concept in contract
law? In what respect can legitimate expectations or estopp el be used in o rder to
interpret som e terms of the co ntract? ’
13
See B lack’s Law D ictionary, supra note 3 , at 142 .
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the courts of law and equity traditionally have recognized.14 A few
examples convey the general idea:
The doctrine of ‘assignor estoppel,’ for example, bars a person who has
assigned a patent from later attacking the patent’s validity. 15 This rule
serves an easily understood purpose. Suppose an inventor obtains a patent
to an invention and then sells the patent to someone else. The inventor
should not later have the ability to compete with the buyer of the patent in
making the invention by claiming that the patent lacks validity. By selling
the patent, the inventor in effect represented the validity of the patent and
should have to live with that representation rather than cause the buyer to
suffer a forfeiture.
‘Estoppel by election’ is a doctrine which says that a person who makes
a choice among possible benefits cannot later claim benefits that a different
choice would have afforded.16 For example, if a plaintiff sues a defendant
for breach of contract and seeks specific performance, a court might
conclude that the plaintiff is thereby estopped to seek rescission of the
contract.17 Simple justice precludes taking inconsistent positions that let
you have your cake and eat it too.
And ‘authority by estoppel’ is a doctrine that says that one person (the
principal) may not deny that another person (the agent) has authority to act
for him or her after giving a third party reason to believe such authority
exists. For example, if a business owner sends a salesperson to make a
contract with a client, the business owner cannot later back out of the
contract by claiming that the salesperson lacked authority. Allowing the
business owner to change positions on the issue of authority would work
a hardship on the customer.18
*171 Judges created these and other estoppel doctrines to prevent
substantive and procedural injustices. Each of the doctrines accords with

14
See, e.g., id. at 52 , 142 , 590 (defining ado ption by estoppel, authority by
estop pel, assignor estoppel, and ma ny more types of estoppe l).
15
See W estingho use Co. v. Fo rmica Co., 266 U.S. 342 , 349 (1924).
16
See Cruz-Lovo v. Ryder System, Inc., 2003 W L 2315 0113, *3 (11th Cir.
2003) (‘The doctrine of estoppel by election provides that, when a party adop ts a
certain positio n that affects the relatio nship b etween that pa rty and the adverse
party, i.e., a position pertaining to a contractual agreement between the parties, the
party is equitably estopped from impeaching its position to the detriment of the
adverse p arty.’).
17
See E ldridge v. Burns, 142 C al. Rptr. 845 , 870 (Cal. A pp. 1 978 ).
18
See, e.g., Herrera v. Gibbs, 49 9 S.W .2d 9 12, 9 15 (Tex. Civ. A pp. 1 973 ).
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the general tendency of courts of equity to frown on inconsistency,
self-serving conduct, and the passing of burdens from the persons who
created them to those who did not. And these and other examples of
estoppel have become firmly established in the legal order; no one seriously
contemplates doing away with what the Supreme Court has called the
‘venerable doctrine of estoppel.’19
B. Textualism
Textualism rests on two related principles. The first is legislative
supremacy. The idea is that once legislatures have enacted constitutional
legislation, the judicial and executive branches must follow it.20 They do
not have the choice of reconsidering the legislation’s policy or modifying
the legislation to meet perceived needs. Otherwise, we would not fully have
a government of laws.
The second principle concerns how legislatures work. It says that
legislatures speak authoritatively only through enacted legislation.21 In
accordance with this principle, textualists consider the wording of a statute
the primary basis for determining the statute’s meaning. They read the
statute to find ‘the meaning most in accord with context and ordinary
usage. ‘22 In difficult cases, textualists may employ canons of construction
to help parse the statutory terms.23 They also may consult dictionaries and
other sources that provide evidence of the standard meanings and usages of

19

Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 3 95 U .S. 65 3, 67 4 (U .S. 19 69).
See Jo hn F. M anning, Te xualism and Legislative Intent, 91 Va. L. Rev. 419,
444 -445 & n. 8 4 (2005 ); Farb er, supra note 10, at 283 -294 .
21
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Te xt, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub . Pol’y 61, 68 (1994). For general articles on
textualism, see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
Harv. L. Rev. 405 (1989 ); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The
‘New ’ New Legal Process, 12 Cardo zo L. Rev. 159 7, 16 39 (199 1).
22
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the jud gment).
20

23

See Zeppos, supra note 21, at 1616. Typ ical example s include the ‘expressio
unius’ canon, see N ational R.R. P assenger C orp. v. National Ass’n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 , 458 (1974) (by expressing one thing, a statute excludes
other thing), and the ejusdem generis maxim, see Breininger v. Sheet Metal
W orkers Int’l Ass’n, 493 U.S. 67, 91-92 & n.15 (198 9) (context may narrow the
meaning of a term).
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words.24 And they may look at other parts of the legislation for contextual
clues.25
But textualists generally eschew consideration of other extrinsic sources
when attempting to discern the meaning of legislation. They *172 do not
try to divine the subjective intent of Congress by looking at committee
reports, floor statements, or other forms of legislative history. They also do
not allow policy considerations to influence their reading of statutes.
Taken together, these two principles generally require judges to follow
legislation and forbid them from treating anything other than legislation as
law. Accordingly, judges cannot create exceptions or glosses or anything
else that would contradict what the statute says. If a party has rights under
an enactment, he or she can assert them.
Textualism has many adherents. For many years, its leading judicial
advocate has been Justice Antonin Scalia. In his judicial opinions and
extra-judicial writing, he has consistently advocated textualist approaches
to statutory interpretation.26 And although the Supreme Court issues some
non-textualist decisions, Justice Scalia has influenced many of the members
of the Court. This influence in turn has encouraged the spread of textualism
in lower courts.27
C. The Tension
Although few courts have recognized it explicitly, a tension exists
between the standard application of principles of estoppel and the textualist
school of statutory interpretation. The tension is that sometimes principles
of estoppel appear to lead courts to ignore the objective meaning of
statutes. Although a statute may give a party in a lawsuit a claim or
defense, the court may rule that the party is for one reason or another
estopped to present the claim or defense, even though the statute says
24

See M errill, supra note 9, at 35 6-35 7; Bradley C. Kar kkainen, ‘Plain
Meaning ’: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 Harv.
J.L. & Pub . Pol’y 401, 407 (1994).
25
See Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘Plain Meaning’: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence
of Strict S tatutory C onstruction, 1 7 H arv. J.L. & P ub. P ol’y 401, 40 7-08 (1994).
26
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5; Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct.
771, 782 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part).
27
See G regory E. M aggs, T he Secret D ecline o f Legislative History: Has
Someone Heard a V oice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 Pub. Int. L. Rev. 57, 58.
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nothing about estoppel. In this way, principles of estoppel may create - or
at least appear to create unwritten exceptions - to legislation.
The typical statute of limitations, as discussed above, provides an
illustrative example. A statute of limitations says that a plaintiff has a set
number of years in which to bring a lawsuit. Most statutes of limitations
contain no express exceptions relating to the conduct of the defendant. But
courts nonetheless sometimes do not permit a defendant to assert the
expiration of a period of limitations as a defense, citing the judge-made
doctrine of ‘equitable estoppel.’28
*173 In the context of the statute of limitations, equitable estoppel
allows a plaintiff to assert a claim against the defendant, even if the statute
of limitations has expired, when the ‘defendant takes active steps to prevent
the plaintiff from suing on time.’29 These active steps may include
fraudulently concealing the injury that the defendant has caused or assuring
the
plaintiff that the statute of limitations will not be asserted as a defense.
30
A typical statute of frauds provides another example. A statute of
frauds usually says that a court may not enforce a contract unless it is
evidenced by a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is
sought. 31 For instance, many states have statutes of frauds saying that a
promise that cannot possibly be completed within one year is not enforceable unless evidenced by a signed writing.32 Such a statute would, for
example, prevent a plaintiff from enforcing an oral promise by the
defendant to maintain a building for five years unless the defendant at some
point signed a written document revealing in some way that he or she had
made the promise.

28

See, e.g., In re International Administrative Services, Inc., 408 F.3d 689, 699
(11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the period of limitations in the Bankruptcy Code
for bringing avoidance actions is subject to tolling by equitable estoppel); Rauscher
v. City of Linco ln, 691 N.W .2d 8 44, 8 51-8 52 (Neb. 20 05) (city estop ped from
asserting statute of limitations to block claim for unp aid wa ges).
29
Sharp v. U nited A irlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 368 , 372 (7th C ir. 200 1).
30
Ho lmbe rg v. Armbrecht, 327 U .S. 39 2, 39 6-97 (1946).
31
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 5, stat. note (1981) (providing an
informative overview of statutes of fraud in the U nited S tates).
32
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 162 4(a) (1985) (‘The following contracts are
invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and
subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent: (1) An agreement that
by its terms is not to b e performed within a year from the making thereof. ...’).
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But many courts have used principles of estoppel to overcome statutes
of frauds and enable them to enforce oral promises. Under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel, for instance, courts might prevent the defendant from
denying the existence of a signed writing if the defendant told the plaintiff
that a signed writing exists (‘I have signed the offer that you sent me’) or
if the defendant told the plaintiff that no writing was required or that he or
she would not rely on the statute of frauds.33 And under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, some courts would enforce the promise, notwithstanding the lack of a signed writing, if the plaintiff had relied on the promise.34
In these examples, principles of estoppel serve in effect to create
unwritten exceptions to legislation. In applying these principles, a *174
court denies the defendant the right to assert the statute of limitations or the
statute of frauds as a defense, even though the text of the statute appears to
give the defendant that right. These judicially created estoppel doctrines,
in other words, seem to trump the legislation.
This phenomenon seems inconsistent with textualism. If a legislature
has enacted a statute of frauds, a statute of limitations, or any other statute,
shouldn’t the enactment prevail over unwritten judicial doctrines like
estoppel? Isn’t the text of the statute controlling under the doctrine of
legislative supremacy? Shouldn’t the legislature have responsibility for
determining what exceptions should and should not exist?
Despite the existence of this tension, the use of estoppel for such
purposes is common, long-standing, and accepted, even among otherwise
textualist courts. And yet no court to date has offered a comprehensive
explanatory theory for the practice. So the question arises whether closer
analysis might reveal any possible rationalizations for using estoppel to
overcome the language of statutes.
33

See Monarco v. Lo Greco, 220 P.2d 737, 740 (Cal. 1950) (describing how
equitable ‘estoppel to plead the statute of frauds can ... arise when there have been
representations with respect to the requirements of the statute indicating that a
writing is not necessary or will be executed or that the statute will not be relied upon
as a defense’).
34
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(1) (1981) (‘A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance
is enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only
by enforcement of the promise.’). See also Gregory E. Ma ggs, Ipse Dixit: The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law,
66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 508, 523-525 (1998) (analyzing the reception of § 139 in
the United S tates).
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III. Possible Textualist Rationalizations
As the foregoing part of this article has shown, courts have relied on
principles of estoppel to reach results apparently contrary to the plain
language of statutes. For example, they have enforced contracts that the
text of a statute of frauds says they should not enforce and they have
entertained claims that the language of a statute of limitations would bar.
The following discussion considers eight possible rationalizations to
explain how this practice might be consistent with textualist principles.
A. Authorized by Other Legislation
Even if a particular statute does not contain any express estoppel
exceptions, a textualist judge in some instances might still find the
exceptions to exist on grounds that some other legislation creates them. In
other words, one statutory provision might authorize courts to use
principles of estoppel when applying a separate statutory provision. In such
a case, a textualist judge would be following rather ignoring legislative
commands when invoking estoppel principles.
Consider, for example, § 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which establishes a statute of frauds for contracts for the sale of goods.35
This section says that no contract for the sale of goods for a *175 price of
$500 or more may be enforced absent a signed writing evidencing that the
contract was made. Section 2-201 contains various express exceptions, but
none of these exceptions concerns estoppel.36 Accordingly, if a textualist
judge were to look just at the language of § 2-201, he or she might conclude
that estoppel cannot bar a defendant from asserting the statute of frauds.
35

The pre-2003 verison of this mod el statute says: ‘Except as otherwise
provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or
more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing
sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and
signed by the party against whom enforc ement is sought or by his authorized agent
or broker.’ U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (20 02). This version of the statute is in effect in 49
states and numerous territories. The American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Co mmissioners on U niform State Law ap proved an amendment to
this provision in 2003 that would raise the dollar threshold from $500 to $5000, see
U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2004), but no state has yet adopted that change. This essay
therefo re will refer to the pre-20 03 version.
36
See U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (2002) (creating an exception for transactions between
merc hants where the merchant to be charged does not respond to a memorandum
confirming an oral contract); id. § 2-201(3) (creating exce ptions for specially
manufactured goods, formal admissions that a contract has been made, and
transac tions in wh ich the good s or payment has been received).
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But that analysis would not be complete. The Uniform Commercial
Code contains another important statutory provision, § 1-103(b) (formerly
§ 1-301), which contains the following statement:
(b) Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform
Commercial Code], the principles of law and equity, including the
law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract, principal
and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,
mistake, bankruptcy, and other validating or invalidating cause
supplement its provisions.37
Pursuant to this provision, some courts have concluded that the Uniform
Commercial Code authorizes and indeed requires them to consider
principles of estoppel when applying the statute of frauds in § 2-201, even
though § 2-201 itself does not say anything about them.
When legislation specifically directs courts to make reference to
principles of estoppel, textualism stands as no bar to the use of these
principles. On the contrary, textualism requires it. But this possibility only
rarely explains why textualist courts may supplement statutes with estoppel
principles for two reasons.
First, very few enactments contain provisions that specifically authorize
courts to resort to estoppel principles. Section 1-103(b) applies to the
Uniform Commercial Code, but it does not apply to statutes of fraud,
statutes of limitations, and other enactments outside of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Consequently, this first basis upon which textualist
judges might rationalize their use of estoppel principles to affect the
application of statutes has a very limited application.
Second, even though provisions like § 1-103(b) exist, their application
is not always clear. The text of the section says that principles of estoppel
apply ‘[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions’ of *176 the Uniform
Commercial Code.38 Some courts have concluded that § 2-201, the statute
of frauds, in fact does displace estoppel because it lists several specific
exceptions and does not list estoppel.39 These courts have concluded that
the legislatures that enacted § 2-201 did not want courts to use principles
of estoppel.

37

Id. § 1 -103 (b) (emph asis added ).
U.C .C. § 1 -103 (b).
39
See, e.g., Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 635 P.2d 103, 107
(W ash. 1981). See also W arder & Lee E levator, Inc. v. Britten, 274 N.W.2d 339,
345 (Iowa 197 9) (R eynoldson, C.J., dissenting).
38

ESTOPPEL AND TEXTUALISM

12

B. Implied Estoppel Terms
How else might a textualist judge conclude that principles of estoppel
affect the application of a statute that says nothing expressly about
estoppel? In some instances, the judge might decide that the statute at issue
contains an implied term concerning estoppel. For example, the court
might interpret a statute of frauds or statute of limitations to have an
implicit estoppel exception that the legislature intended, but did not state
expressly.
The principles of textualism do not categorically preclude the finding
of implied terms in legislation. But under textualist theory, the conclusion
that an act contains an implied term must rest on the language, structure,
and evident purpose of the statute. The implied term cannot arise from
policy considerations, legislative history, or other extrinsic evidence.
Justice Scalia addressed the textualist approach to implied terms in his
dissent in Zadvydas v. Davis.40 In that case, the government detained an
alien named Zadvydas pursuant to a section of the federal Immigration and
Naturalization Act allowing the Attorney General to detain an alien who is
removable from the country based on violations of criminal law.41 The
statute contained no express limitation on the duration of the detention; on
the contrary, the statute appeared to permit the government to hold the alien
until his or her removal to a foreign country, however long that might take.
But when the United States could find no other country to which it
could remove Zadvydas, he challenged his continued detention. Concerned
that a statute authorizing indefinite detention might violate Due Process, the
majority of the Supreme Court construed the statue to contain a ‘reasonable
time’ limitation.42 Justice Scalia dissented,*177 addressing the question
from a textualist perspective.43 Although he appeared to agreed that
statutes may contain implied terms, he found no basis for concluding that
the Immigration and Naturalization Act contained an implied term that

40

533 U.S. 678 (2001).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994 ed., Supp. V) (‘An alien ordered removed
who is inadm issible under se ction 1 182 of this title, remo vab le under section
1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) of this title or who has been determined
by the A ttorney G enera l to be a risk to the community or unlikely to comp ly with
the order of removal, may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released,
shall be subject to the terms of supervision in p aragraph (3).’).
42
533 U.S. at 699 -700 .
43
Id. at 706-0 7 (Sc alia, J., disse nting).
41
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would help Zadvydas.44 He saw nothing in the text, structure, or purpose
of the Act that would support the majority’s view. Instead, he lamented that
the Court ‘simply amends the statute to impose a time limit.’45
In actual practice, courts that have concluded that principles of estoppel
affect the application of statutes generally have not followed textualist
principles concerning implied terms. Consider, for example, the famous
decision of the California Supreme Court in Monarco v. Lo Greco. 46 In
that case, a rancher orally promised his stepson that he would change his
will to leave him the family ranch if the stepson worked on the property
after he turned 18. The stepson complied, laboring for many years on the
ranch. But after the rancher died, the stepson learned that he had not kept
his promise to change his will, and the property was to go to someone else.
The stepson brought a lawsuit, which in effect sought to enforce the
rancher’s oral promise to change his will. California at the time had a
statute of frauds preventing the enforcement of promises to change a will
unless evidenced by a signed writing.47 This statute, in the ordinary course,
would have prevented the stepson from enforcing the rancher’s promise.
But Chief Justice Roger Traynor concluded that the rancher’s estate was
estopped from asserting the statute of frauds because of the stepson’s
reliance on the rancher’s promise.
The decision did not rest on grounds that the statute of frauds contained
an implied exception for reliance. Chief Justice Traynor’s opinion did not
even address the text of the applicable statute of frauds. Instead, the
opinion simply concluded that refusing to enforce the rancher’s promise
would be unconscionable and that estoppel therefore should apply.48 If the
California Supreme Court had considered the issue from a textualist
perspective, it would have had to look at the statute carefully to decide
whether the language, structure,*178 or purpose of the act would justify
finding the existence of an implied estoppel exception.
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Courts that have taken a textualist approach with respect to implied
terms generally have not identified implied estoppel exceptions. For
example, in C.G. Campbell & Sons, Inc. v. Comdeq Corp.,49 the court had
to consider whether a plaintiff could use promissory estoppel to overcome
the statute of frauds in Uniform Commercial Code § 2-201. The court
observed that § 2-201 already stated several exceptions to the statute of
frauds, but did not have one related to reliance.50 So the court concluded
that the legislature did not desire additional exceptions, and refused to find
an implied exception for reliance.
C. Inherent Equitable Power of the Courts
Textualist judges also might rationalize using principles of estoppel to
affect the application of a statute on grounds that courts have ‘inherent’
equitable powers. Inherent powers are powers that exist even though no
legislation specifically grants them. The Supreme Court long has maintained that the federal courts have inherent equitable powers. As early as
1888, the Court declared that ‘the equitable powers of the courts of the
United States, sitting as courts of law, over their own process, to prevent
abuse, oppression, and injustice, are inherent, and as extensive and efficient
as may be required by the necessity for their exercise.’51
But with these inherent equitable powers, may courts override the text
of statutes? The Supreme Court appeared to do that in United States v.
Young,52 where it relied on inherent equitable powers to conclude that a
bankruptcy court could toll a limitation period under the Federal Bankruptcy Code. In that case, Mr. and Mrs. Young filed a bankruptcy petition
in 1997 and received a discharge. The IRS subsequently sought to collect
from the Youngs a tax debt from 1993. The Youngs asserted that the tax
debt was discharged in their 1997 bankruptcy, but the IRS contended that
it was not discharged pursuant to an exception found in the Bankruptcy
Code.
Under the exception, if the IRS has a claim for taxes ‘for which the
return was due within three years before the bankruptcy petition was filed,’

49

586 S.W .2d 4 0 (K y. Ct. Ap p. 19 79).
See id . at 41.
51
Gum bel v. P itkin, 124 U .S. 13 1, 14 5-14 6 (1888 ).
50

52

535 U.S. 43 (2 002 ).

ESTOPPEL AND TEXTUALISM

15

the claim is nondischargeable.53 Although the tax claim *179 at issue in the
case was in fact more than three years old in 1997 when the Youngs
received their discharge, the IRS argued that the Youngs should be
estopped to assert the three-year look-back period. The IRS pointed out that
the Youngs had filed but withdrawn another bankruptcy petition, after 1993
and before 1997, preventing the IRS from pursuing the tax debt earlier.
Although the Youngs correctly argued that the Bankruptcy Code
contained no provision expressly providing for tolling, the Supreme Court
sided with the IRS. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia - the
leading textualist jurist - concluded that equitable tolling extended the
three-year look-back period specified in the exception. Justice Scalia
explained the decision by saying that it was reasonable to conclude that
Congress was ‘assuming that bankruptcy courts will use their inherent
equitable powers to toll the federal limitations periods within the Code.’54
Given that courts have these inherent equitable powers, Justice Scalia
apparently saw the text of the statute as no impediment to tolling the
limitation period.
The Young decision may appear to provide a general rationalization for
the use of estoppel to affect the application of statutes that do not provide
for estoppel. But the case raises two questions. The first concerns the
scope of a court’s ‘inherent’ equitable powers. The opinion does not say
exactly when a court can find equitable tolling appropriate and when it
cannot. It also does not make clear whether a court may use its inherent
equitable powers to address only procedural and jurisdictional questions like the application of the statute of limitations - or whether the courts also
can employ them more generally to affect the substance of the law.
Consider another bankruptcy decision from the Supreme Court, Taylor
v. Freeland & Kronz, 55 which took a very different approach. In that case,
when a debtor named Davis declared bankruptcy, she filed a list of her
property that she claimed to be exempt from distribution to creditors.
Everyone subsequently agreed that Davis did not have a legal basis for
claiming some of the listed property as exempt. But § 522(l) of the
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Bankruptcy Code said that property claimed as exempt is exempt, unless
the bankruptcy trustee or a creditor objects.56 Federal Bankruptcy Rule
4003(b) gave the bankruptcy trustee and creditors exactly 30 days for
submitting objections. In the case, no one objected within this time.57
*180 Later, when the trustee realized that Davis did not have a basis for
claiming some of the property as exempt, he filed an untimely objection.
The majority of the Supreme Court refused to allow the bankruptcy trustee
to make a late objection given the plain language of Rule 4003 and §
522(l). The Court recognized that its decision allowed Davis to keep
property that he otherwise could not keep from his creditors. But the Court
saw no grounds for intervening. ‘Deadlines may lead to unwelcome
results,’ the Court said, ‘but they prompt parties to act and they produce
finality.’58
The dissent disagreed, expressing a view more like that of the Court in
Young. The dissent would have allowed the bankruptcy court to disallow
claims based on equitable considerations even after the 30-day period if the
debtor did not have a good faith basis for asserting the exemption. Quoting
a bankruptcy court that had adopted this view, the dissent said: “’[e]quitable considerations dictate that a debtor should not be allowed exemptions
to which she is obviously not entitled.”’59
Why the Court thought that the bankruptcy court could use its equitable
powers to toll the three-year look-back period in Young but could not use
those same powers to toll the 30-day objection period in Taylor remains
unclear. Maybe a court’s inherent equitable powers have some sort of
relevant limits, but the Court has not said what they are, or why they would
lead to different results in the two cases. At the very least, Taylor shows
that courts cannot always cite inherent equitable powers as a basis for using
estoppel to affect the application of a statute that does not address estoppel.
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Second, the Young decision leaves open the issue of whether legislatures might limit the inherent equitable power of courts. For example,
suppose that Congress had expressly said in § 522 that a court cannot toll
the three-year look-back period. Could a court nonetheless use its equitable
power to toll the period? Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Young
does not address this question precisely. But it does suggests that the
answer is no. Justice Scalia ruled that the Youngs were estopped on ground
that it was ‘reasonable’ to conclude that Congress had assumed courts
would have that power.60 If the statute had prohibited tolling, the Court
could not have found it reasonable to conclude that Congress had wanted
courts to engage in equitable tolling.
*181 D. Background Principles and Canons
A textualist judge also might rationalize using principles of estoppel to
affect the application of statutes on grounds that no one statute re-creates
the entire legal universe. The theory is that, when a legislature passes a
new act, it assumes that the act will fit into the existing legal system.
Congress, for example, does not specify in each new federal law the
circumstances in which the federal courts will have jurisdiction over the
law; it already has enacted a general statute regarding jurisdiction over
federal acts.61 Similarly, the legislature may presume that courts will
interpret any new law that it enacts in accordance with existing canons of
construction. And likewise, the reasoning goes, a legislature may expect
that courts will apply traditional equitable principles in interpreting a new
law, even if legislature does not say anything about them.
Justice Scalia articulated this idea concisely in the Young bankruptcy
case,62 discussed above, as an additional justification for concluding that
estoppel could toll the ‘look-back period’ for making tax debts nondischargeable. He said:
It is hornbook law that limitations periods are “customarily subject to
‘equitable tolling,”’ . . ., unless tolling would be “inconsistent with the text
of the relevant statute” . . . . Congress must be presumed to draft limitations
periods in light of this background principle. . . . That is doubly true when
it is enacting limitations periods to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which
are courts of equity and “appl[y] the principles and rules of equity
60
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jurisprudence.”63 In this instance, as Justice Scalia explains, estoppel does
not seem inconsistent with the principles of textualism. But the idea that
Congress understands that courts will interpret new legislation subject to
existing canons can be more problematic for textualists. Some of the
canons of construction that courts have identified, especially in the past,
may conflict with the idea that the text of statutes binds the courts.
Consider the famous case of Sorrells v. United States.64 In that case, the
government prosecuted Sorrells for violating federal liquor laws during the
prohibition era. Sorrells wanted to raise a defense of entrapment, but the
government argued that the criminal statute at *182 issue did not make
entrapment a defense. The statute, in fact, was silent on the subject.
The Supreme Court, though, sided with Sorrells, relying both on
estoppel and on the idea that Congress enacts legislation subject to the
expectation that courts will interpret it in accordance with existing canons
of construction. The Court cited a general canon saying that the criminal
laws should be construed as narrowly as possible to accomplish their
objective. It then said:
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in
enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement should
be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part
of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and
to punish them. We are not forced by the letter to do violence to the spirit
and purpose of the statute. This, we think, has been the underlying and
controlling thought in the suggestions in judicial opinions that the
government in such a case is estopped to prosecute or that the courts should
bar the prosecution.65 So because Congress had no need to punish people
whom the government lured into criminal wrongdoing, estoppel prevented
the government from prosecuting such people.
Is Sorrells a textualist decision? In a subsequent decision, Justice Scalia
seemed to think so, but expressed a caution. Citing Sorrells and similar
decisions, he said:
It is one thing to acknowledge and accept such well defined (or even
newly enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumed
legislative intent. It is quite another to espouse the broad proposition that
criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly as they are written, but
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are subject to case-by-case exceptions.66 In other words, according to
Justice Scalia, judges may use canons and background principles of law to
interpret statutes, but only if the canons and background principles are not
intrinsically inconsistent with textualism.
It turns out that the Court has not applied the approach of Sorrells
consistently. On the contrary, the Court sometimes simply declares that
there is no estoppel exception to a statute, regardless of whether estoppel
is a general background principle. In Reiter v. Cooper, for example, the
Court considered a federal statute requiring shippers to pay the tariff rate
that freight carriers had filed with the *183 Interstate Commerce Commission. 67 In the case, a common carrier declared bankruptcy. The bankruptcy
trustee then brought a lawsuit against a shipper who had paid the carrier
less than the filed rate, seeking to collect the underpayment. The shipper
argued that the trustee should be estopped to collect the underpayment. But
the Court, citing precedent, simply held: ‘The filed rate doctrine embodies
the principle that a shipper cannot avoid payment of the tariff rate by
invoking common-law claims and defenses such as ignorance, estoppel, or
prior agreement to a different rate.’68 The Court offered no explanation for
why estoppel might apply in a case like Sorrells but not in this case.
Even if the Court did apply Sorrells consistently, the idea that courts
always may use canons of construction raises three difficult questions. The
first question is how to identify canons. Consider, for instance, the
question of whether a court may hold that a defendant is estopped from
asserting the statute of frauds as a defense when the plaintiff has relied on
the defendant’s promise. Can a canon of construction exist on a long
disputed issue of this kind? That seems a little unlikely. As a result, a
textualist judge would have to rationalize using estoppel to reach this result
on some other ground.
The second question is how to distinguish between permissible and
impermissible canons, especially those concerning estoppel. Justice Scalia
says that canons of construction cannot simply allow judges to create
exceptions to statutory language on a case by case basis. But the exact
content of the restriction remains unclear, especially when cases likes
Sorrells and Reiter reach contrary conclusions on whether estoppel may
prevent the application of a statute.
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The third question is whether legislatures can abrogate canons of
construction and background principles. For example, if a criminal statute
expressly says that entrapment is not a defense, may a court read the
defense into the statute through principles of estoppel? The Sorrells
opinion suggests that the answer is no. The Court emphasized in that
decision that it was not ‘doing violence to the statute’ by reading in the
defense based on principles of estoppel.69 But the issue remains how
clearly Congress must speak if silence on the issue is not enough.
E. Outside the Statute
A textualist judge also might justify the application of estoppel by
concluding that estoppel creates a cause of action or other legal right that
the statute, by its terms, does not address. For example, suppose that a
statute of limitations requires a particular kind of legal*184 claim to be
brought within three years and the statute contains no mention of exceptions resting on estoppel. A textualist judge might worry about estopping
a defendant to rely on the statute of limitations as a defense to the claim.
But if the court concludes that the plaintiff is actually bringing a different
claim, and that the statute of limitations therefore does not apply, then the
judge may find the defendant estopped.
This kind of reasoning appears in the famous contracts case of Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores.70 In that case, a grocery store chain made vague
assurances to a prospective franchisee named Hoffman. When no franchise
agreement resulted, Hoffman sued the chain, claiming that he had relied on
the assurances in various ways. The chain argued that the assurances could
not be enforced under contract law because they were too uncertain.71 The
court fully agreed with that proposition,72 but enforced the assurances
anyway. The Court explained, simply, ‘this is not a breach of contract
action’;73 instead, according to the court, Hoffman was bringing an action
based on promissory estoppel. And the court said the same requirements of
definiteness did not apply.
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In Hoffman, as in most states, the requirement of definiteness apparently
was specified by the common law rather than by a statute.74 Thus the case
does not actually provide an example of using estoppel to overcome
legislation. But the point remains that the court justified using estoppel to
overcome a defense that would have required a different result. If the state
had required definiteness in contracts by statute, a textualist judge could
have used the same reasoning.
But this possible rationalization for using estoppel to overcome the
application of a defense has a significant limitation. It only works when a
plaintiff can invoke estoppel as a basis for a legal claim to which the
defense does not apply. That possibility arises in the field of contracts, but
not many other areas of the law. In most instances, estoppel bars a party
from taking a legal position, but does not create a cause of action.
*185 F. Pre-Textualist Precedent
Finally, a textualist judge might justify using estoppel to affect the
application of a statute based on precedent. Although the general idea of
legislative supremacy has been around for a long time, the case reports
contain countless non-textualist decisions. Textualist judges may decide
to follow these precedents on grounds of stare decisis, even though they
might disagree with their reasoning.
Consider for example, the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. S.A.P.75 In
that case, a former foster child sued a state agency, claiming that it had
negligently overlooked child abuse. Although the period of limitations had
run, the plaintiff sought to prevent the state agency from asserting the
statute based on equitable estoppel. The court ruled for the plaintiff, citing
previous decisions. The court said: ‘It is well settled in Florida and other
jurisdictions that the statutes of limitation can be deflected by the doctrine
of equitable estoppel. This proposition is supported by vast precedent . . .
. ‘76
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Statements of this kind are typical because precedent supports the use
of estoppel in most states. But this case was made somewhat more
interesting because the state attempted to distinguish the precedent that the
court relied on. Apparently, no prior case had specifically addressed the
particular statute of limitations that governed the case.77 And the state
argued that the precedent concerning other statutes was distinguishable
because the statute at issue applied only to suits filed against the government. But the court ultimately rejected the argument, following the
precedent concerning other statutes.78
This decision shows that textualist judges cannot always find easy
refuge in precedent when deciding whether estoppel should affect the
application of a statute. If the precedent is not directly on point, judges
have a choice of how broadly to read it. A commitment to principles of
textualism might lead some courts to construe the estoppel precedent
narrowly. The Florida Supreme Court did not follow this course, but a
more committed court might have done so. Thus, precedent does not
provide a complete justification for applying principles of estoppel when
they lead to results contrary to the language of legislation.
*186 IV. Conclusion
Textualist judges generally strive to follow the text of statutes. They do
not attempt to create exceptions to what the statute says based on policy
arguments, remarks made by legislators, or other extrinsic evidence. And
yet, they often apply principles of estoppel in ways that affect the application of statutes, even though the statutes say nothing about estoppel. How
can this be?
This essay has offered six possible rationalizations for how to square
accepted principles of estoppel with textualism. Sometimes legislation
outside the statute being interpreted expressly authorizes courts to resort to
principles of estoppel. At other times courts may conclude that the statute
contains an implied term concerning estoppel. Or courts may decide that
they have inherent equitable powers that authorize them to rely on estoppel.
Alternatively, courts might conclude that the legislature enacted the statute
subject to background principles, including estoppel. More creatively,
courts might determine that the estoppel operates outside the scope of the
statute. And commonly, courts simply cite precedent.

77
78

See id .
See id.

ESTOPPEL AND TEXTUALISM

23

Several aspects of these rationalizations stand out. First, the courts have
made express reference to each of them, but more often they simply apply
principles of estoppel without considering the tension with textualism.
Second, none of the rationalizations can reconcile all uses of estoppel with
principles of textualism. Indeed, some applications of estoppel appear
unwarranted under textualist theory by any of the rationalizations. Third,
several of the rationalizations seem so open-ended that it is difficult to
perceive what limits they have; they might authorize not only estoppel, but
all kinds of exceptions to the statutory language. For these reasons, they
do not provide a fully satisfactory explanation of how textualist judges
should apply principles of estoppel.
This essay has not sought to argue that a judge must or even should
adhere to textualism in statutory cases. That is a subject many others have
addressed. But if judges do choose to follow that course, doctrines of
estoppel continue to present a challenge.

